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The Prevention of Infiltration Law is an Israeli law enacted in 1954, which defines offenses of armed and non-armed infiltration to Israel and from Israel to hostile neighboring countries. The law authorizes the Minister of Defense to order the deportation of an infiltrator before or after conviction.〔(Counter Terrorism in Democracies: The Legal Experience of Israel ), by Dov Shefi. West Point Military Academy, New York, December 8, 1999〕 The purpose of the law was to prevent the entry of Palestinian refugees or their sympathizers (see fedayeen) into Israel and allow for their expulsion, for fear of terrorism. After the 1948 Arab–Israeli War (known to Israelis as the "War of Independence" and to Palestinians as al-Nakba, or "The Catastrophe") and the 1948 Palestinian exodus, many Palestinians who either fled or were expelled from their towns and villages, whether they had had altogether ventured beyond what became Israel (largely into the neighbouring Arab countries of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt) or were internally displaced, tried for many year since then to return to the places they had left. The Israeli Government enacted the Prevention of Infiltration Law in order to forbid and impede, what under the law receives the name of "''infiltration''", into Israel.. The law was amended in 2013, in the context of Illegal immigration into Israel from Africa, setting limitations on the time an infiltrator could be detained, increasing the number of anti-infiltration enforcement officers, and increase compensation to infiltrators who willingly returned to their own countries. ==Context== :''For more information on historical context, see 1948 Palestinian exodus, 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian immigration (Israel) and Israeli-Palestinian conflict''. Palestinian infiltration into Israel first emerged among the Palestinian refugees of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, living in camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria. Most of the infiltration at this time was economic in nature, with Palestinians crossing the border seeking food or the recovery of property lost in the 1948 war.〔Almog, 2003, p. 20.〕 Between 1948 and 1955, infiltration by Palestinians into Israel was firmly opposed by Arab governments.〔''"There is strong evidence from Arab, British, American, UN and even Israeli sources to suggest that for the first six years after the () war, the Arab governments were opposed to infiltration and tried to curb it...The Lebanese...effectively sealed the border with Israel. The Syrian authorities also exercised strict control over their border with Israel, and infiltration was rarer. The Egyptian authorities...pursued a consistent policy of curbing infiltration until 1955...Secret Jordanian documents captured by the Israeli army during the June 1967 war...reveal strenuous efforts on the part of the Jordanian military and civilian authorities...to keep () from crossing (Israeli border )."'' - Shlaim, ''The Iron Wall'' pp. 84-85, ISBN 0-14-028870-8〕〔As an Israel Foreign Ministry official stated: For years the army (IDF ) has been informing the Ministry and the outside world that infiltration is being sponsored, inspired, guided, or at least utilised by the Legion or other powers that be. However...when () asked (army for ) ...some clear documentary proof of the () Legion’s complicity (the infiltrations )...no clear answer came from the army. Finally Fati (deputy DMI Yehoshafat Harbaki ) told Leo (senior Foreign Ministry official ) and myself, on two separate occasions, that no proof could be given because no proof existed. Furthermore, Fati told me that having personally made a detail study of infiltration, he had arrived at the conclusion that Jordanians and especially the Legion were doing their best to prevent infiltration, which was a natural decentralised and sporadic movement. In fact, listening to Fati or his colleagues these days, one could almost mistake them for British Foreign Office (consistently argued in this vein )." Benny Morris (1993) Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-829262-7 P 67〕 The problem of establishing and guarding the demarcation line separating the Gaza Strip from the Israeli-held Negev area, proved a vexing one: largely due to the presence of more than 200,000 Palestinian Arab refugees in this Gaza area.〔(UN Doc S/1459 of 20 February 1950 ) a report on the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions〕 The terms of the Armistice Agreement restricted Egypt’s use and deployment of regular armed forces in the Gaza strip. In keeping with this restriction the Egyptian Government’s answer was to form a Palestinian para-military police force. The Palestinian Border police was created in December 1952. The Border police were placed under the command of ‘Abd-al-Man’imi ‘Abd-al-Ra’uf, a former Egyptian air brigade commander, member of the Muslim Brotherhood and member of the Revolutionary Council. 250 Palestinian volunteers started training in March 1953 with further volunteers coming forward for training in May and December 1953. Part of the Border police personnel were attached to the Military Governor’s office and placed under ‘Abd-al-‘Azim al-Saharti to guard public installations in the Gaza strip.〔Yezid Sayigh (1999) Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993. Oxford University Press ISBN 0-19-829643-6 p 61〕 It was only after Israel's raid on an Egyptian military outpost in Gaza in February 1955, in which 37 Egyptian soldiers were killed, that an Arab government - in this case the Egyptian - began to actively sponsor fedayeen raids into Israel.〔''"Records show that until the Gaza raid, the Egyptian military authorities had a consistent and firm policy of curbing infiltration...into Israel...and that it was only following the raid that a new policy was put in place, that of organizing the fedayeen units and turning them into an official instrument of warfare against Israel."'' - Shlaim, p. 128-129.〕 According to the Jewish Agency for Israel between 1951 and 1956, 400 Israelis were killed and 900 wounded in fedayeen attacks.〔(【引用サイトリンク】Jewish Agency for Israel "> title=Map )〕 From time to time, too, the Israeli authorities arrested groups of Arabs who had stayed in the country without being granted Israeli nationality and pushed them over the frontier. These Arabs would often return and, through their relatives, obtain decisions from the Israeli courts allowing them to stay in Israel.〔Jiryis, Sabri (1981): ''Domination by the Law''. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 10th Anniversary Issue: Palestinians under Occupation. (Autumn, 1981), pp. 67-92.〕 During the 1949–1956 period the motivation of infiltration was social or economic concerns.〔Benvenisti, Meron (2000): ''(Sacred Landscape: Buried History of the Holy Land Since 1948. Chapter 5: Uprooted and Planted )''. University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-21154-5〕 For some time these practices continued to embarrass the Israeli authorities until finally they passed a law forbidding Palestinians to enter Israel, those who did so being regarded as "infiltrators.".〔 Most of the people in question were refugees attempting to return to their homes inside the new Israeli state. Between 30,000 and 90,000 Palestinian refugees returned to Israel as a result. They wanted to return to what were their homes prior to the Arab-Israeli War, looking for their lost loved ones, harvesting crops from fields that were confiscated, and to reclaim property other than land. There were also Bedouin to whom the concept of newly established borders were foreign. Arabs declare the infiltration into Israel's territory to have been a direct consequence to the displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian refugees during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. To Israel, the infiltration was a large problem. Israel's answer to this was to establish new settlements along the border and raze the abandoned Arab villages. A "free fire" policy towards infiltrators was adopted — a policy of shooting those crossing the international armistice line illegally. Eventually, the Israeli leadership came to the conclusion that only retaliatory strikes would be able to create the necessary factor of deterrence, that would convince the Arab armies to prevent infiltration. Although the strikes were sometimes confined to military targets (particularly, at the later stages of the infiltration), numerous civilians were killed, prompting the question whether the strikes were a form of collective punishment. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Prevention of Infiltration Law」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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